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Abstract 
This article maintains that in our second best world, neither corruption nor the informal sector and political 
instability can be held responsible for the moderate performance of the Ukrainian economy. Corruption in 
Ukraine appears to act as “grease in the wheels of the economy”, while informal activities add to the welfare 
of its people. And, no connection of political instability with economic performance may be contemplated 
conclusively. The cause of the inefficiency of private and public investment is traced to poor public 
governance. Massive infrastructure investments can become the remedy (i) in the context of public-private 
partnerships with the collaboration of the subnational governments, and (ii) in financing the projects through 
domestic monetary expansion, under a macroeconomic policy viewpoint emphasizing the monetary rather 
than fiscal side of the venture. The proposed monetary expansion can only work only under the proper 
multiplier, accelerator, and capital accumulation link. Special care should be taken to improve the industrial 
organization of the inefficient banking sector.                                                                                                              
Keywords: Ukrainian economy, Second-best theory, Infrastructure investments, Monetary expansion                                                                                                    
Resumen 
 
Este artículo manifiesta que en nuestro mundo de la segunda mejor opción, no se puede atribuir ni a la 
corrupción ni al sector informal y a la inestabilidad política el rendimiento limitado de la economía 
ucraniana. En Ucrania, la corrupción parece funcionar como “lubrificante para las ruedas de la economía”, 
mientras las actividades incrementan el bienestar de su pueblo. Además, no se puede contemplar de manera 
definitiva ninguna conexión entre la inestabilidad política y el rendimiento económico.  La causa de la 
ineficencia de las inversiones particulares y públicas resalen a la gobernación pública ineficaz. Las 
inversiones masivas en infraestructuras pueden constituir un remedio (i) en el ámbito de partenariados entre 
los sectores públicos y privados con la colaboración del gobierno a nivel sub-nacional y (ii) financiando los 
proyectos mediante una expansión monetaria interior, desde un punto de vista de política macroeconómica 
que se enfoque en el aspecto monetario de la inversión más que en el fiscal. La expansión monetaria 
propuesta puede funcionar únicamente con el enlace correcto entre multiplicadores, aceleradores y la 
acumulación de capital. Se debe cuidar en particular de mejorar la organización del sector bancario 
actualmente ineficiente.                                                                                                                                           
Palabras clave: Economía ucraniana, teoría de la segunda mejor opción, inversiones en infraestructura, 
expansión monetaria 
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In own hut - there's own truth, own power, own will 
Taras Shevchenko, 1844, “The Paternal Hut of T. H. Shevchenko in the Village of Kyrilivka” 
1. Introduction 
The five factors accounting for the moderate performance of the modern Ukraine economy 
are its corruption, informal sector, political instability, poor public governance, and inefficient 
private and public investment (see e.g. Hubarieva et al. 2016, Kuzio 2016, Grazhevska et al. 
2015, Vinnytsuk and Ziukov 2013). Economic performance is deemed to be moderate from 
the viewpoint of the average performance in Europe and Central Asia as illustrated by Table 
A1 in the Appendix. Size-wise, corruption, informal sector, political instability, poor public 
administration, and investment project inefficiency in Ukraine are undeniably in excess 
relative to OECD standards, indeed. These five phenomena do have their share in the weak 
performance of Ukrainian economy. Yet, in our second best world, there is “no evil without 
good” the ancients used to say, and it is argued herein that the “good” outweighs the “evil” 
for at least the first three of the above five factors as follows.  
About corruption, there is one thesis that it is “sand in the wheels of growth” (see e.g. Meon 
and Sekkat 2005), and there the opposite thesis that it is “grease in the wheels of growth” (see 
e.g. Beck and Maher 1986, Lien 1986, Huntington 1968, Leff 1964): Simply, graft speeds up 
investment and subsequently, growth, raising thereby efficiency in the second best world of 
ill-functioning institutions. Actually, corruption and competitiveness go almost hand in hand 
in Figure A1 of the Appendix, which corroborates the “grease” viewpoint not only for 
Ukraine but for other economies as diverse from each other as Russia, Germany, Greece, 
Japan, China, UK, and Australia are. The presence in general of a positive correlation 
between corruption and growth is not something new as it has been documented in a number 
of Asian economies under the term “Asian paradox” (Vial and Hanoteau 2010). We are living 
in a second best world and we should be hearing its music however unpleasant the sound may 
be… 
Also, about the informal economy in Ukraine, what strikes one from the detailed account of 
this economy in the doctoral thesis of Onoshchenko (2012) is the large discrepancy between 
registered and unregistered unemployment. For example, total unemployment in Mykolayiv 
region was 96018 persons but only 2939 were registered as such in 2010, which attests to the 
conclusion that: “Informal employment is… an extensively used form of work … that 
positively contributes to economic and social development, acting both as an important 
seedbed for enterprise creation and development and as a primary vehicle through which 
community self‐help is delivered in contemporary Ukraine” (Williams et al. 2007, 402). 
Indeed, the informal sector is an all-private sector and its composition changes with its size to 
be meeting the konjunktur of the times given the size and content of the public sector. For 
example, what can one make out of the conclusion drawn from Table A2 in the Appendix that 
the percent of official firms facing competition from informal firms in high-income non-
OECD economies was higher than that in Ukraine in 2013? The informal economy is 
embedded in any economy as a natural outgrowth of human nature, it competes with the 
formal economy, and the intensity of the competition depends on the konjunktur. It assists 
rather than retards the performance of the economy, and what really Table A2 captures is not 
a quantitative difference across regional economies but a qualitative facet of the different 
states of the economy prevailing in these regions.  
Let us next come to the matter of political instability. Prompted by the post-Euromaidan 
events in East Ukraine, a plausible indicator of this instability would be the terrorism index. 
The similarity of the pattern of this index with the pattern of the debt-to-GDP ratio on the top 
of the left-hand side of Figure A2 in the Appendix, is striking but the same holds more or less 
for other countries presented there. Instead, growth is closely related to the government 
budget as depicted on the top of the right-hand side of the same Figure. One is thus inclined to 
infer that to the extent that the budget reflects the instability of the political system regardless 
the issue of terrorism, political instability does influence the course of economic activity 
critically. Yet, the same close relationship between annual growth and budget is the case for 
other counties too, as depicted in the same side of the Figure. Hence, the budget crystallizes 
all sorts of concerns coming secondarily only out of political instability. And, as Figure A3 
shows, the budget does relate to corruption too, which again is not a feature special to 
Ukraine. As Bardhan (2006, 341) notes: “Even in democratic countries where many top 
bureaucrats are political appointees, not career civil servants, corruption is sometimes 
hierarchically organized, so that political and bureaucratic corruption are interlocked.” In 
sum, political instability in Ukraine is not a factor that can be held critically responsible for 
the course of the economy. 
2. The Problem and the Proposed Remedy 
Nevertheless, budget considerations prompt immediately the issue of the quality of public 
governance, since one of the good-quality desiderata is regulation and policymaking 
encouraging the operation of the market as a means of resource allocation. This has not been 
the case in Ukraine if one judges based on Figure 1, which shows that whenever the worker 
has a pay rise, the tax authority comes to appropriate it (Figure 1A) to give it back through the 
government budget (Figure 1B). This government attitude reflects past, Soviet era practices, 
and distorts resource allocation, encouraging investment in consumer rather than capital 
goods (Figure 1C) under increasingly favorable conditions for the investor (Figure 1D). The 
whole picture is one of a command-economy treatment of the worker and of a neoliberal call 
to the businessman, especially if one notes the increasing profit margin implied by the 
comparison of Figures 1A and 1D. Some might argue that this increase is the risk premium 
accompanying political instability; perhaps, but, there is not instability other than the one the 
businessman sees to justify profit increase. 
Figure 1A: Income (blue line) and Income Tax (dotted line): 2003-2016
 
 
 
Figure 1B: Consumer Spending (blue line) and Government Spending (dotted line): 2003-2016 
 
Figure 1C: Consumer Spending (blue line) and Investment (dotted line): 2003-2016 
 
 
Figure 1D: Investment (blue line) and Corporate Tax (dotted line): 2003-2016 
 
Anyway, the government has to address at least the problem of resource misallocation, which 
brings up the second of the broad desiderata for good-quality public governance, namely the 
government‟s engagement in public-private partnerships (PPPs) to invest in the massive 
infrastructure projects needed by Ukraine. This, “reconstruction” task has to be undertaken in 
collaboration with the regional governments too, to alleviate in addition the regional 
asymmetries in the country (Kallioras and Tsiapa 2016). Ukraine has to proceed towards that 
direction “standing on its own feet” for two reasons. First, globalization has made financial 
investment much more profitable than real investment (Woolley 2010), limited only foreign 
investment should be anticipated, and if it does come it will not without the restraints implied 
by globalization and the subsequent limited usefulness for the national economy (Kramar et 
al. 2015). And second, reliance on foreign borrowing and international institutions like the 
IMF, only austerity will bring to the country, which is widely rejected as sound policymaking 
(Krugman 2015, Fatás and Summers 2015).  
The way infrastructure investments should be conducted – investment that will subsequently 
attract more private investment in good quality consumption and production goods, weaken 
corruptive and informal activities “naturally” and not coercively, increase employment, raise 
tax revenue, and foster political stability − is outlined comprehensively in documents like 
those by IBRD (2013, 2016), and OECD (2014). This is also the way that the third 
desideratum for quality public administration would be justified; the way of having efficient 
top-down methods from the governments to the central and local bureaucracy. The focus 
herein is to clarify what Ukraine “standing on its own feet” means. It means, first and 
foremost, that unlike Eurozone countries and at a lesser extent the other EU counties, Ukraine 
has in its own hands the powerful policy instrument of printing money. It can use this weapon 
to conduct expansionary monetary policy along the lines prescribed by the pre-WWII 
Chicago School version of the quantity theory of money as, for instance, is spelled out in 
DeLong and Summers (2012), and Tavlas (2015). In a few words, investment projects should 
be financed by issuing domestic currency Hryvnia (UAH) for the sake of boosting the 
spending of the public primarily and only secondarily for the fiscal dimension of the 
undertaking, (which is the opposite of what Keynesians would suggest). The increased tax 
base of the subsequent growth will help cover the current deficits in the future.  
Also note that the monetary expansion proposed here, is expected to lower interest expenses, 
which will raise (i) net cash flow and strengthen the financial position of firms, and (ii) the 
value of the borrower‟s collateral and hence, borrowing ability. But, this will be the case only 
if the banking system is efficient. A healthy bank system is a prerequisite for the success of 
the proposed policy venture and measures should be taken to better bank industry efficiency, 
since according to Isik et al. (2016, 1), in Ukraine: “… [the] bias for size causes large banks 
to suffer from decreasing returns to scale and small banks from idle capacity”. Banks are 
financial intermediaries, important for the transmission of monetary policy, and can upset the 
whole reconstruction scheme if they are not in the position to pass money policy changes on 
to their customers in an efficient manner. 
Even so when “…in the absence of trust and functioning capital markets barter is a self-
enforcing response to imperfect input and financial markets”  as Marin et al. (2000) would 
caution based on evidence about barter exchange in Ukraine. There ought to be a renewed 
quantitative mapping of this sector of the informal economy to avoid repeating those pitfalls 
in the proposed expansionary monetary policy mentioned in Marin et al. (2000). And, of 
course, quantitative research encompassing all key at least aspects of this policy, including the 
subject of fiscal multipliers in Ukraine (Mitra and Poghosyan 2015), would be important in 
developing some standards against which the macroeconomic performance of policy 
intervention could be measured, because mistakes like those of the IMF when measuring the 
multipliers in Greece (Blanchard and Leigh 2013) would be highly costly for the country. 
Macro-econometric models like those by Nikolaychuk and Sholomytskyi (2015), and 
Stavytskyy and Martynovych (2012) can form the basis of more elaborate ones but focusing 
on the merits of the proposed policy and not on inflation targeting as they currently do, with 
only a passing concern about the demand-side of the economy. 
3. Formal Considerations 
Formally, following Werner‟s (2012) approach to the quantity theory equation, let the total 
nominal money stock,  , be decomposed into one part used in the official sector of the 
economy,  , and the remaining part,  , financing informal economy operations so that, 
             ( ) 
Let, also, the price indices,    and   , and outputs,    and   , corresponding to these two 
sectors, be related to    and   , through the behavioral parameters    and   , respectively, 
as follows:  
                                ( ) 
Consequently, 
                     (  ) 
Coefficients   are inverses of money circulation velocities, which exceed one and hence 
     . Since informal activities are supposed to have to remain hidden from the 
authorities, financed thereby mostly in terms of cash, the velocity of the circulation of money 
in the hidden economy is higher than that in the official economy (Tanzi 1983), implying: 
     . Inserting ( ) in ( ), and taking rates of growth, 
  
      
 
(     )  
      
 
(     )      ( ) 
where the lower-case letters (except  ) denote rates of growth. ( ) may be rewritten as 
follows: 
        
  
  
(     )      (  ) 
Suppose now that the inflation rate which is targeted by monetary policy is  ̂  so that all else 
being the same for the policymaker who has to operate based predominantly if not wholly on 
official economy data,   ̂    . But, when this money growth is inserted in (  ), 
 ̂     
  
  
(     )      ( ) 
So, if the inflation rate is targeted in response to inflationary pressures in the official 
economy, then  ̂      , which implies deflation/contraction of the informal sector; 
       . If, on the other hand, deflation/recession prevails in the official economy and a 
mild inflation,  ̂      , is thought that it will help rekindle the economy, inflation 
targeting will help rekindle the informal sector as well.  
Given now the presence of inflationary pressures in Ukraine and its large informal sector, a 
policy of inflation targeting appears to be the proper one. But, Ukraine is also a country with 
extensive unemployment, underconsumption, and underinvestment as well. And, the present 
call for massive infrastructure investments from the perspective of the quantity theory of 
money to boost consumption demand too, is supported by the following considerations. Let 
the expenditure side of   ‟s composition be           , where      and  , stand for 
real consumption in the official sector, private investment in the same sector, and government 
expenditure;   denotes infrastructure investments under PPPs, separate from private 
investment and other government outlays. The income side is         , where   is 
saving and   is taxes. Hence,        , or letting              and      , with 
       , so that (   )          
    (     )      ( ) 
where    (   )⁄  is the expenditure multiplier;   is presumably the average tax rate. It 
follows in turn that, 
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where      and  , are the official growth rates of      and  , respectively. Letting   and    
denote capital in the official economy and its growth rate, respectively, identifying   with  , 
and adopting for convenience an accelerator model of private investment,           ⁄  
   , ( ) becomes, 
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Inserting next (  ) in (  ) yields, 
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It is clear that a policy of inflation targeting, setting    ̂  [                   (  )], 
would not change the conclusions reached earlier about the consequences of this policy.  
Instead, let us introduce in the discussion public debt, which is defined on the basis of 
measured quantities, i.e. of official economy quantities. We want debt, of course, to be 
sustainable so that in line, for instance, with Ley (2010), if the debt is  , the real interest rate 
is  , and primary government-budget-balance change is undesirable, then  
  (
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where the values of   and  are fixed to those at the time the proposed policy is adopted. It is 
a policy of a money growth rule regardless the value of  . A constant money-growth rule 
would be if        
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given the current       and  , which     without PPPs. Inserting  (  ) in ( ), yields, 
  
 (     )          
(     )          
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where      ⁄ , with     for ( ) to be positive given positive (     ) and   and  . 
Consequently,       
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Derivatives ( ) and ( ) are alternative expressions of the money growth rule, which in 
addition will be a constant growth rule if ( ) and (  ) hold as well. Equating next (   ) and 
( ), one obtains that, 
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That is, the negative effect of the proposed policy on the informal economy, capitalizes upon 
the fact that the financing of public spending deprives this economy of the much needed cash 
to carry out its transactions, encouraging thereby its contraction regardless the presence of 
PPPs. And, contrary to inflation targeting, this result is also independent of the phase of the 
business cycle. 
4. Unlocking the Real Deadlock of Ukraine? 
As of September 2016, the debt was 556073015 thousand UAH, with M0=292938 million 
UAH, M1=489704, M2=1053861, and M3=1053690 UAH (see http://www.tradingeconomics 
.com/ukraine/indicators). So,   =1.898,   =1.1355, and       0.527. Also, as of June 
2016,   =1.4%, and as of October 2016,  =14%. Hence, from ( ),   =9.96%,   =5.96%, 
and       2.77%. Moreover, as of June 2016,   =228252 million UAH and  =52282 
million UAH. Therefore, from ( ), after some calculations, 
25762346.74(     )= - 619959.96     = - 41.55(     )      (11a) 
15416824.84(     )= - 370966.93     = - 41.56(     )      (11.b) 
7167569.3(     )= - 172373.75     = - 41.58(     )      (11.c) 
under       and    . It appears that (     )   , but inserting any value of the product 
of    in a different equation, results always in, 
           (12) 
given the rounding of decimals. And, since    , we have to have from (11) that    . 
These are results regardless the value of  . For example, with    , (11.a), (11b) and (11c) 
become, 
25762346.74(     )= - 619959.96   - 2         (11.d) 
15416824.84(     )= - 370966.93   - 2         (11.e) 
7167569.3(     )= - 172373.75   - 2         (11.f) 
Solving (11.f) for 2   , inserting the result in (11.e), and solving the subsequent expression 
for   , yields,   = - 41.54(     ), which difference with   = - 41.56(     ) owes 
certainly to rounding. Moreover, inserting   = - 41.54(     ) in (11.d), one obtains that, 
    (     )= -      (     )         ⁄    
which is again the result given by (12). Would any monetary expansion work along the lines 
of the previous section? It can be easily shown than the answer will be negative unless the 
deadlock of (12) is resolved. The fact and only that it is a deadlock, it has to be resolved, 
anyway. If there is any restructuring of the economy that has to tackled first, it is this one 
since it relates to the relationship between the multiplier, the accelerator, and capital 
accumulation. Of course, (12) turned out to be the case under the particular numbers used, 
and numbers do change from year to year. But, these numbers might connote some inherent 
weakness of the economy, which is something that should be double-checked: The focus of 
policy in general should be to ensure that      .  
5. Concluding Remarks 
To get rid of “oligarchs” (cf. financial elite), corruption, and twilight economy, is a simple but 
big “word” that only ... those who can‟t hear the music of the dance can utter. These are 
phenomena innate in every market social economy; and when something upsets the habitual 
course of socioeconomic life, they adjust accordingly. So, if one wants to contribute ones 
opinion on ways to improve the political economy of Ukraine, one will be honest by 
proposing means that would not upset this economy even further as a quest for a “shock 
therapy” against corruption and underground economy would engender. These should be 
means that would make these two phenomena to just fade away with a little help from the 
state, but not abruptly. And, this is the mentality under which this short narrative of the 
Ukrainian economy was prepared.  
Especially careful one has to be when the matter comes down to oligarchs. The Bolsheviks 
cracked down on financial elites brutally and the result was the               out of which 
the oligarchs supposedly sprung up (sic). And, unfortunately, the involvement of elites in 
economics and politics is a universal phenomenon, nowadays, not special to Ukraine, Russia, 
and the rest of Eastern Europe. Here, in this article, we took a view of this involvement from 
the viewpoint of corrupt oligarchs, as a factor with which the urgency of expansionary 
economic policy would have to come at terms temporarily to get the country moving. 
Mobilizing the financial elite towards this direction as well, it is hoped that economic 
progress will be increasingly marginalizing rent-seeking on the part of those in this elite who 
engage in such practices. Even more important for the government is to make oligarchs and 
the people see that corrupt statesmen with low level of law compliance is not the social norm. 
This is a very difficult task because people, individually, only slowly revise their impressions 
about societal norms even if developments in this “front” tend to falsify them (Nagdy and 
Roser 2016). 
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APPENDIX 
Table A1: Ukraine vs. Europe and Central Asia 
 1990 2000 2015 
GNI per capita, Atlas method (current US$): UKR 1,610 700 2,620 
Europe & Central Asia 9,710 12,397 24,147 
GNI per capita, PPP (current international $): UKR 6,930 3,700 7,810 
Europe & Central Asia 11,280 15,765 29,477 
Inflation, GDP deflator (annual %): UKR 16.3 23.1 40.2 
Europe & Central Asia 5.8 3.8 0.9 
Gross capital formation (% of GDP): UKR 27 20 15 
Europe & Central Asia 25 23 20 
Time required to start a business (days): UKR … 40 7 
Europe & Central Asia … 42 10 
Tax revenue (% of GDP): UKR … 14.1 18.3 
Europe & Central Asia 18.3 20.2 19.5 
Source: World Development Indicators database 
 
Table A2: Percent of firms competing against unregistered or informal firms 
Ukraine 50.1 
Eastern Europe & Central Asia 39.1 
High income: non-OECD 56.0 
High income: OECD 34.2 
Middle East & North Africa 42.6 
Sub-Saharan Africa 65.5 
South Asia 41.1 
East Asia & Pacific 53.2 
Latin America & Caribbean 61.9 
All Countries 52.2 
Source: World Bank; http://www.enterprisesurveys.org/data/exploretopics/informality 
  
Figure A1: Corruption Index and Competitiveness Index (dotted line): 2003-2016:                                   
Source: tradingeconomics.com 
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Figure A2: Terrorism Index (dotted line) and Debt-to-GDP ratio (left-hand column) and 
Government Budget (dotted line) and GDP Annual Growth (right-hand column): 2003-2016                                                               
Source: tradingeconomics.com 
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Figure A3: Corruption Index and Government Budget (dotted line): 2003-1016                                       
Source: tradingeconomics.com 
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